Arbitration Clauses - A Balancing Act

The Mississippi Court of Appeals just released a decision addressing the scope of arbitration clauses. Although the case dealt with an employment agreement, the decision is certainly a warning sign for arbitration clauses in any contract.

At issue in the case was whether tort claims for assault and battery were included within the arbitrable claims of the employment agreement. The agreement required arbitration of "all matters directly or indirectly related to your recruitment, potential employment, or possible termination of employment, including, but not limited to, claims involving and/or against the Company, employees, supervisors, officers, and/or director of [Company] or any affiliates, as well as any other common law claims for wrongful discharge or other similar claims." Even though the Court determined that the foregoing language was broad and that the claims stemmed from a supervisor’s alleged actions while on a business trip, the Court nevertheless ruled that the arbitration provision did not include claims for assault and battery.

One judge disagreed with the Court’s majority. In a separate opinion, the dissenting Justice noted that in a case decided four years prior an agreement that required "any dispute under this agreement" to be arbitrated included intentional tort claims.

The current decision does not overrule the older court decision, and distinguishing factual circumstances can be found between the two decisions. However, the current decision at least constitutes a warning signal that the Court will look more closely when considering whether intentional torts fall within the ambit of arbitration provisions. A delicate balancing act will be required to make arbitration provisions broad enough to capture as much as possible, yet specific enough to include what might be considered more remote claims. Everyone should revisit the language of its contractual arbitration provisions or risk being in court to settle disputes rather than arbitration.

Mississippi Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management's New Standards for Disqualification of Bidder

If you are bidding on projects awarded through the Mississippi Department of Finance and Administration, Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management ("the Bureau"), you might not be awarded the contract, even if you are the apparent low bidder.

The Bureau is very particular about with whom it does business. Effective May 18, 2009, the Bureau has expanded the grounds for disqualifying a bidder from competition. (Link to rules.) These recent changes are highlighted below.

1.04 DISQUALIFICATION OF BIDDER: A Bidder may be disqualified for any of the following reasons:

A.  Failure to comply with the bid requirements.  (This provision was in 600.53 but missing in 1.04 of the Instructions to Bidders.

B.  Bidder is in arrears on existing Contract with the Bureau or another state agency.

C.  Bidder is, or anticipates being, in litigation or arbitration with the Bureau or another state agency.

D.  Bidder has defaulted on a previous Contract.

     

    BOB Manual, Instructions to Bidders, Section 00100, Part 1, General, Paragraph 1.04.

Mississippi’s Public Procurement Statute requires award to the "lowest and best bidder". However, the Mississippi Courts have recognized that the lowest bid may not necessarily be the best bid. Thus, state agencies have been afforded considerable deference when deciding which contractor has submitted the "lowest and best bid". One of the areas the Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized may be considered in the evaluation of bids is a contractor’s past performance record. However, in my opinion, the Bureau’s grounds for disqualification impermissibly expand the area of inquiry by seeking to penalize a contractor for exercising its contractual right to pursue a claim against the Bureau or another state agency with which the contractor has a contract.

The Bureau’s new grounds for disqualification gives it the authority to now reject a bid if the contractor "anticipates" being in litigation or arbitration. Hypothetically, this means that if a contractor has a contract with the Bureau or another state agency, writes a "claim" letter stating the contractor believes it has a right to an equitable adjustment in the contract price and/or time and subsequently submits a bid on another Bureau project, the contractor’s bid may be rejected because the letter could be construed as a sign the contractor "anticipates" being in litigation or arbitration with the Bureau. The Bureau may even require a certification as part of its bid requirements wherein the contractor must represent it does not anticipate being in litigation or arbitration with the Bureau or another state agency. The obvious intent of this provision is to discourage contractors from asserting claims against the Bureau or another state agency on construction projects. It appears the Bureau has made the decision that such draconian tactics are more effective then dealing with legitimate claims which the contractor has a right to assert under the Bureau’s contract documents.

Using the "Best Evidence" of Construction Damages is Required to Ensure Recovery

Mississippi law requires that a party introduce the "best evidence" available to prove its alleged damages.  The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated the basic rule of proof of damages as follows:

It is absolutely incumbent upon the party seeking to prove damages to offer into evidence the best evidence available [for] each and every item of damage.  If he has records available, they must be produced.  While certainty is not required, a party must produce the best that is available to him.

See Eastland v. Gregory, 530 So.2d 172, 174 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added).

In applying this rule, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that evidence was insufficient where a party claimed that a buyer had breached its contract to buy a house and the owner had to sell to someone else at a lower price.  The "best evidence" of the sale at the lower price was not introduced because "no records were produced of the sale and event he name of the purchaser was not mentioned."  Id. at 173.  The Court indicated the kind of evidence that would have been "best", observing "[t]here was no contract of sale with the second purchaser offered into evidence, no check for purchase price, no deed, no record whatever, simply the statements by Mr. and Mrs. Gregory [the owner] that the house sold for $175,000.00."  Id. at 175.  The owner also claimed interest paid on a construction loan he had to take out in the amount of "about $4,300.00."  Id. at 174.  Even though a copy of a note was introduced into evidence, the Court ruled that the testimony was in error, stating:

In the first place there was no showing that the Eastland's breach of the contract in any way necessitated Mr. Gregory borrowing $85,000 to build his new home...  There may have been some damage occasioned by the breach of contract in addition to having to sell the residence for a less sum of money, but no predicate whatever was laid for such assessment by the jury.  A bare conclusory statement by Mr. Gregory that because of the Eastlands' breach he had to borrow the money hardly suffices.

Id. at 174 (emphasis added).  See also Caver v. Brown, 818 So.2d 376 (Ct. App. Miss. 2002) (citing Eastland); City of New Albany v. Barkley, 510 So.2d 805, 807 (Miss. 1987) ("while the measure of damages need not be perfect, the most accurate and reliable evidence available should be required.")

The rule is very straightforward and has been summed up precisely:

...[T]he highest degree of proof of which a case is susceptible must be produced.  This is the Mississippi rule...  What we rule here is that if basic fact records exist, those records, not opinions as to what they could have been, should form the evidentiary basis for introducing their content into this cause.

See Harrison v. Prather, 435 F. 2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).

In addition, the Rule 1002 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided by law."  This rule reflects the "best evidence rule."

 

Who Can be a "Qualifying Party" for a Contractor's Certificate of Responsibility?

To perform any public contract of at least $50,000 or private contract of at least $100,000, a contractor must hold a Certificate of Responsibility issued by the Mississippi State Board of Contractors.  It makes no difference whether the "contract" to be performed is a prime contract or subcontract at any tier.  Miss. Code Ann. 31-3-15.

Moverover, Mississippi law does not permit the "borrowing" of certificates of responsibility.  Only a responsible managing officer, employee, or member of the executive staff of the applicant for the certificate can serve as its qualifying party.  The statutes creating the State Board of Contractors, which governs the licensing of contractors, and that Board's regulations implementing those statutes are designed to prevent one person from serving as the qualifying party for entities in which he or she has not personal or managerial stake or responsibility.  To allow otherwise would dilute the requirements which are meant to ensure the integrity, financial capacity, and technical capability of all entities performing construction in Mississippi.

Miss. Code Ann. 31-3-1 defines a "certificate of responsibility" as a "certificate numbered held by a contractor issued by the board under the provisions of this chapter after the payment of the special privilege license tax..."

Miss. Code Ann. 31-3-13(a) defines who can be the "qualifying party" or an applicant of a certificate of responsibility, whether such application is for a new certificate or a renewal certificate.  Specifically, it states:

The board shall take applicants under consideration after having examined him or them and go thoroughly into the records and examinations, prior to granting any certificate of responsiblity.  If the applicant is an individual, examination may be taken by his personal appearance for examination or by the appearance for examination of one or more of his responsible managing employees; and if a co-partnership or corporation or any other combination or organization, by the examination of one or more of the responsible managing officers or memebers of the executive staff of the applicant's firm, according to its own designation.

The intent clearly is that a qualifying party be a responsible managing employee for or officer of the applicant, whether it's a sole proprietorship or corporation.  The true "responsibility" for which the certificate is issued cannot be determined otherwise.  In construing this requirement the State Board of Contractors promulgated the following regulation which, again, leaves no doubt that the "qualifying party" must be intimately involved in the management and/or ownership of the entity claiming him or her as their qualifying party.  Rule L states:

When the qualifying party terminates employement with the Certificate holder, the Mississippi State Board of Contractors must be notified in writing, by the qualifying party and the Certificate holder, within thirty (30) days of the disassociation and another party must qualify within one hundred eighty (180) days or Certificate holder will be subject to suspension or revocation of its Certificate of Responsibility.

(Emphasis added).

Thus, where a purposed "qualifying party" for Company A is neither a managerial employee nor an officer of that company but, in fact, owns or is the officer of another, unrelated Company B, but Company B routinely serves as a subcontractor to Company A, Company A and its purported "qualifying party" are in violation of MIssissippi law and the Rules and Regulations of the State Board of Contractors.  (This is typically done where owners of two companies do not want to commingle business assets, finances, or interests, but they do want to pursue and perform contracts together.)  Company A's Certificate of Responsibility is null and void as a matter of law.