Hubzone Contracts Take Set-Aside Priority Over 8(a) Program

In Mission Critical Solutions v. United States, COFC No. 09-864 C (March 2, 2010), the Court of Federal Claims has determined that the HUBZone program takes priority over the 8(a) program.

Mission Critical Solutions ("MCS") was certified as both an 8(a) and HUBZone small business. In 2008, the Department of the Army awarded MCS a one-year sole-source 8(a) contract for just under $3.5 million to provide information technology ("IT") services. For the follow-on requirement, which was valued (including options) at approximately $10.5 million (in excess of the applicable $3.5 million ceiling on sole-source contracts), the Army determined it could not make award to MCS. However, the Army decided it could make a sole-source 8(a) award to Copper River Information Technology, LLC ("Copper River"), an Alaska Native Corporation, if the SBA would approve Copper River as the IT provider for the requirement. SBA accepted the requirement on behalf of Copper River under its 8(a) program and the Army made the award.

MCS protested the sole-source 8(a) award to Copper River to the GAO. MCS argued that the Army was required to compete the requirement as a HUBZone business set-aside. The GAO sustained MCS’s protest. However, the Office of Management and Budget ordered that executive agencies disregard the GAO’s ruling until the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Justice Department ("OLC") reviewed the matter. After the OLC declared its disagreement with GAO, the Army took the position that it had no authority to take any action inconsistent with the OLC’s position. Thus, MCS’s request for protest costs and a second protest against the award were denied by GAO as "academic", because the Army had stated its position that GAO recommendations could not be followed in the matter. MCS took its protest to the Court of Federal Claims.

Chief Judge Emily Hewitt sided with MCS and declared the Army’s award to Copper River under the 8(a) program not in accordance with law. The Army’s argument that there is parity between the 8(a) and HUBZone requirements was rejected. Judge Hewitt found that the HUBZone statute mandates set-asides for competition among HUBZone concerns whenever there is a reasonable expectation that at least 2 qualified HUBZone firms will submit offers and award can be made at a reasonable price. The plain language of the HUBZone statute at 15 USC § 657a(b)(2) requires such set-asides "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law". Moreover, whereas contracting officers "may" decide to award contracts under the 8(a) program when the HUBZone statutory set-aside criteria are not met, there is no such discretion for contracting officers when the HUBZone statutory are met. Judge Hewitt enjoined the Army from awarding the IT support services contract without first determining whether the "rule of two" is met "such that the contract opportunity at issue in this case must be awarded on the basis of competition among qualified HUBZone small business concerns."

Do you have coverage under your Commercial General Liability Policy for Defective Subcontractor Construction?

Less than one week after placing readers on alert about the pending decision of Architex Association, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, the Mississippi Supreme Court has issued its decision in that case addressing the following narrow issue with regard to a Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy:

Whether the intentional act of hiring subcontractors by an insured general contractor precludes the possibility of coverage?

The Court found "that under Scottsdale’s CGL policy, the term ‘occurrence’ cannot be construed in such a manner as to preclude coverage for unexpected or unintended ‘property damage’ resulting from negligent acts or conduct of a subcontractor unless, otherwise excluded or the insured breaches its duties after loss." Slip Op. at page 27. Thus, "[f]aulty workmanship, defective work, et al., may be accidental, intentional, or neither." Slip Op. at page 23.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in ACS Construction Company v. CGU, 332 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 2003) had previously concluded that since hiring a subcontractor is a deliberate and intentional decision by a general contractor, any subsequent act by the subcontractor must be intentional and not covered under the definition of an "occurrence". The insurance industry has used ACS to deny coverage for defective work by subcontractors, even though many general contractors purchased policies and paid premiums with the understanding that their CGL policy would provide coverage.

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Architex brings clarity to the issue stating that "[w]hile the alleged ‘property damage’ may have been ‘set in motion’ by Architex’s [the general contractor] hiring of the subcontractor, the ‘chain of events’ may not have ‘followed a course consciously devised and controlled by [Architex], without the unexpected intervention of any third person or extrinsic force.’" In other words, hiring a subcontractor will not preclude coverage under a CGL policy.

Even if the insurer does not unequivocally agree that there is coverage under the CGL policy, the insurer may agree to defend the general contractor under reservation of rights. This means the insurer will pay the general contractor for the cost associated with defending the claim of defective workmanship. This does not mean the insurer gets to select the attorney to defend the claim, it means the insurer must pay for the attorney the general contractor selects to defend the claim. Therefore, it would be wise for the general contractor to select a construction lawyer to defend the claim rather than the insurer’s preferred attorney who is likely to have experience in defending slip and fall cases and car wrecks and not complex construction defect cases.

The Architex decision is good news for general contractors. However, the decision also admonishes general contractors that there are other reasons for denial of coverage such as failure to give timely notice of a potential claim. Slip Op. at page 12, fn. 11. This means that general contractors should place their insurance carrier/agent on written notice of any potential claim for which the CGL policy might arguably provide coverage. Otherwise, coverage may ultimately be denied.

Insurance Coverage Under Commercial General Liability ("CGL") Policy in Mississippi--"Is defective work by a subcontractor an "occurrence" which triggers coverage under the CGL policy?"

The Mississippi Supreme Court has decided to retain the case styled Architex Association, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company; Case No. 2008-CA-01353. The construction industry is hopeful that the Mississippi Supreme Court will provide some clarity in the area of insurance coverage for defective construction under CGL policies. Several years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in ACS Construction Company v. CGU, 332 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 2003) muddied the waters when it held:

Under Mississippi law, Moulton [Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moulton, 464 So.2d 507 (Miss. 1985)] and Omnibank [United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Omnibank, 812 So.2d 196 (Miss. 1996)]make clear that in a CGL insurance policy which defines an "occurrence" as an "accident," coverage is triggered if the underlying act was intentional and deliberate. These cases also make clear that an "occurrence" defined as an "accident" in a CGL insurance policy does not refer to the unintended consequences of the act. Thus, the district court did not err when it applied Moulton and Ominbank and concluded that ACS’s intent to subcontract with Chamberlin/Southern and its intent to install the waterproofing membrane to the bunker roofs did not constitute an "occurrence" under its CGL insurance policy with CGU to trigger coverage. For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

After ACS, the insurance industry became strident in its position that there was no coverage under the CGL policy for defective work by a subcontractor because such defective work did not constitute an "occurrence" thereby triggering coverage under the CGL policy. There are a number of jurisdictions that have confronted the issue with differing outcomes. However, there is currently no definitive Mississippi decision which specifically addresses this issue.

The issues which the Mississippi Supreme Court have been asked to address by the construction industry in Architex are as follows:

Whether unexpected, unforeseen and unintended defects in a subcontractor’s work, resulting in unexpected, unforeseen and unintended property damage, is an "occurrence" as defined in a CGL policy?

Whether a CGL policy written on the 1986 standard form that includes an exception from exclusion for property damage arising out of the work of a subcontractor provides completed operations coverage if that subcontractor’s work proves to be defective and causes property damage?

Amicus briefs have been filed by the Associated General Contractors of America; the Associated General Contractors of Mississippi, Inc.; Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. Mississippi Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.; the Mississippi Asphalt Pavement Association, Inc. and the American Subcontractors Association, Inc. and the American Subcontractors Association of Mississippi, Inc. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §9-4-3, the Mississippi Supreme Court is required to render decisions on appeal within 270 calendar days after final briefs are filed, which was June 17, 2009. Accordingly, a decision from the Court should be issued sometime in April 2010. Stay tuned.

 

 

The Limits of Contractual Indemnity

The Mississippi Supreme Court recently made it unmistakably clear that a contractual indemnity provision cannot exceed the limitations set in Miss. Code Ann. § 31-4-41 which provides:

With respect to all public or private contracts or agreements, for construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of buildings, structures, highway bridges, viaducts, water, sewer or gas distribution systems, or other work dealing with construction, or for any moving, demolition or excavation connected therewith, every covenant, promise and/or agreement contained therein to indemnify or hold harmless another person from that person’s own negligence is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.

 

This section does not apply to construction bonds or insurance contracts or agreements.

(Emphasis added.)

In this recent decision, the Court considered an indemnity provision in a Shipyard Agreement. The Court found the statute unambiguous and concluded that to the extent that the indemnity provision sought to indemnify one party for its own negligence the provision was void. The Court further held that this defense can be preserved by setting forth the defense that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Remember to read your contract and carefully consider the language of any indemnity provision when you sign the contract and again if you become involved in litigation. Depending upon the particular circumstances, you might even consider purchasing additional insurance coverage of your own for adequate protection.

"He who hesitates is lost." - Protecting Payment Rights in Mississippi

The Mississippi Court of Appeals has reaffirmed that a subcontractor must file a "Stop Payment Notice" prior to an owner making full payment to the general contractor. Otherwise, the subcontractor loses any hope of payment from the owner based upon that notice and the exclusive remedy for payment is against its general contractor.

In the recently published decision of Summerall Electric Co., Inc., et al. v. Church of God at Southaven, the Church of God at Southaven ("the Church") entered into a contract with an unlicensed general contractor for the construction of a new church. The general contractor engaged a number of subcontractors who performed work on the church but were not paid by the general contractor. The subcontractors filed "construction liens" against the church’s property. However, the subcontractors did not take this action until after the owner had already paid the entire contract amount to the general contractor.

The subcontractors advanced a number of arguments seeking to recover their money directly from the Church.

  • The first argument was that the filing of the "construction liens" gave the subcontractors the right to recover against the Church. The Court disagreed because the Church had already paid the general contractor in full when the subcontractor’s notices were filed. For that reason, the subcontractors were mere creditors of the general contractor with no right to recover from the Church.  
  • The next argument was that because the Church entered into a contract with an unlicensed general contractor the Church should be liable. Under Mississippi law, a construction contract is null and void if a license is required for that contract. The subcontractors apparently argued that because the general contractor was unlicensed the prime contract was null and void and the Church therefore owed payment directly to the licensed subcontractors. The Court disagreed again, finding if the prime contract was null and void, then nothing would be owed to the general contractor and therefore the subcontractors would have no remedy either.
  • Finally, the subcontractors argued that there was an "agency relationship" between the prime contractor and the Church which bound the Church directly to the subcontractors. The Court rejected that argument too on the basis of insufficient evidence.

In the end, the subcontractors were left "holding the bag." The real lesson here is for both subcontractors and general contractors. Know when you are required to be paid and, if payment is late, exercise your remedies under the contract document and the appropriate payment statutes. The saying: "He who hesitates is lost", is not just a cliché but a truism that cannot be ignored in these difficult economic times.

MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT COMPELS ARBITRATION AGAINST PURPORTED NON-SIGNATORY TO AGREEMENT

The Mississippi Supreme Court handed down a decision this month upholding the proposition that an arbitration agreement can be enforced against someone who did not sign the agreement. However, the facts of the case were unusual in that the individual (Donna Stuckey) against whom arbitration was ordered presented evidence that at least some of the documents involved in the transactions contained forged signatures.

In this case, the defendants had pledged certain property to the bank as collateral for loans made to their cattle business. Mrs. Stuckey’s name appeared approximately fifty-five times on documents containing arbitration provisions. However, Mrs. Stuckey claimed the only document she actually signed was one deed of trust which did not include an arbitration provision. Mrs. Stuckey admitted she was one of the owners of the cattle business. She asserted numerous claims, including forgery, against the bank and one of its employees who was also an owner of the cattle business. She further claimed she suffered damages when the bank employee took profits from the sale of cattle without her knowledge or permission. Because the only document which Mrs. Stuckey admitted had been signed by her did not include an arbitration provision, she disputed the matter was subject to arbitration.

The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that it did not matter whether Mrs. Stuckey’s signature was forged and it did not matter that the deed of trust had no arbitration clause. The Court held since Mrs. Stuckey was a co-owner in the cattle business she was a third-party beneficiary to the loan agreements which included arbitration provisions. The Court also concluded that Mrs. Stuckey was equitably estopped from claiming she was not subject to arbitration on the basis that she could not claim breaches of duties associated with the loan documents and at the same time claim that she was not bound by the provisions in those documents.

This decision serves as a reminder of two principles: (1) You can’t have your cake and eat it too. The Mississippi Supreme Court recognizes and disfavors simultaneous attempts to claim the benefits of a contract and to disclaim application of certain contract provisions. (2) Arbitration continues to be favored by courts.

American Arbitration Association Amends Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures

 

Effective October 1, 2009, the American Arbitration Association issued amendments to the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.  The revised rules and procedures can be viewed by clicking on this link:  Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.  The American Arbitration Association has also provided a Summary of Significant Changes that can be found by clicking on this link: Summary of Significant Changes.

Contracts for Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business Concerns

Service-Disabled Veteran Owned ("SDVO") contracts are one of several types of "set-aside" contracts which permit qualified entities to compete for federal government contracts on other than "full and open" competition terms. SDVO contracts are taking their place among small business set-asides, 8(a) set-asides, and HUBZone set-asides. With submission of its initial offer for a SDVO Small Business Concerns ("SBC") contract set-aside, a concern must certify that:

       

    • it is a SDVO SBC
    •  

    • it is "small" as defined by the NAICS code assigned to the procurement
    •  

    • it will comply with the percentage of work requirements set forth in 13 CFR 125.6
    •  

    • if a joint venture, that both members of the joint venture are small; and
    •  

    • if applicable, it is an eligible nonmanufacturer.

Even if a SDVO meets all of the foregoing on a particular procurement, it must still consider the Small Business Administration’s ("SBA") rules on affiliation, all of which can apply to render a "technically" compliant SDVO as "other than small" and therefore ineligible for the award of SDVO contracts. Whether a SDVO wants to ensure it has not run afoul of the rules prohibiting affiliation between SBCs or a SDVO competitor wants to successfully challenge the SDVO status of a competitor, the SDVO needs to be familiar with the rules by which the SBA determines entities to be affiliated.

For example, a SDVO that is deemed unduly reliant upon a subcontractor for performance of the vital or primary functions of a contract may be deemed to be affiliated with the subcontractor. If the average annual receipts of the SDVO and this "ostensible" subcontractor exceed the applicable size limitation, the SDVO will be deemed ineligible for the SDVO contract. More basic still could be a finding of affiliation based on the "newly organized concern" or shared ownership rules.

Affiliation with a subcontractor may also be found even though a subcontractor is not performing the vital or primary functions of a contract. While bonding assistance alone by a subcontractor generally does not create affiliation between a SBC and a subcontractor, when coupled with other performance assistance, it could result in a finding of affiliation. Other indicia of "assistance" include, but are not limited to, bid preparation by the subcontractor rather than the prime SDVO; the loan of equipment to the SDVO by a subcontractor; office sharing by the SDVO and a subcontractor; and payroll, bookkeeping, and other "back office" assistance by the subcontractor. The proximity of the SDVO’s offices may also come into play when affiliation with a subcontractor is examined. For instance, where a SDVO SBC has been located 1100 miles away from the site of contract performance has been determined by the SBA to render the SDVO unduly reliant upon a subcontractor because the SDVO is too remote to provide meaningful, day-to-day management of the project. However, an SDVO’s location 100 miles away from the site of contract performance has been deemed not too remote.

Whether affiliation exists to render your SDVO or a competitor’s SDVO ineligible for a particular procurement or ineligible generally for the SDVO program is very fact-specific. To minimize the risk of being declared "other than small" SDVOs should carefully review all rules by which the SBA examines allegations of affiliation.

CAN I RELY ON MY SUBCONTRACTOR'S CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE?

Every contractor generally requires proof of insurance from its subcontractors, especially with respect to worker’s compensation insurance. In satisfaction of this contractual requirement, subcontractors commonly provide a certificate of insurance to the prime contractor. Is the certificate of insurance sufficient? It may not be.

Many certificates of insurance contain a disclaimer that the certificate is for informational purposes only and does not extend the policy. The disclaimer is a warning that you must look at the policy itself for specific coverage.

In Complete Roofing Services, et al. v. Doherty Duggan & Rouse Insurors, 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (5th Cir. 2009), a certificate of insurance was issued to a general contractor, but the worker’s compensation coverage denoted in the certificate was limited to occurrences only in Georgia. The subcontractor’s employee was injured in Mississippi. The court determined that the "Georgia only" policy did not provide coverage for the injured employee. As a result, the general contractor’s worker’s compensation was required to cover the claim. In this case, it was a catastrophic claim costing the worker’s compensation carrier over $1,000,000.

The best business "policy" is to always obtain and read the actual insurance policy itself. In reviewing the policy, take into consideration the circumstances related to each particular project. For example, consider the following factors: Is the subcontractor from another state? If so, are the subcontractor’s employees from another state or local? Is the subcontractor’s insurance policy state specific? If so, does it cover the state where the project is located? Will any leased employees be used for the project? If so, does the insurance policy cover leased employees or is other insurance required? Are there any warnings or disclaimers in the policy? If so, take heed and consider whether other additional insurance is necessary.

Although the Complete Roofing Services case dealt with a contractor/subcontractor relationship, these basic rules apply to any situation where one party contractually requires insurance from another party. The bottom line is this: get the full policy and read it. This applies to your own insurance policy as well!

(D. Drew Malone is a member of Robinson, Biggs, Ingram, Solop & Farris, PLLC who practices in the area of insurance defense. Drew personally handled this case and contributed to drafting this blog.)

No Certificate of Responsibility = Null and Void Contract

On July 21, 2009, the Mississippi Court of Appeals made it clear that any contract entered into by a party with an unlicensed contractor is null and void. United Plumbing & Heating Company v. AmSouth Bank (Ct. App. No. 2007-CA-01194). This is the first reported decision that addresses the interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. § 31-3-15. This statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

No contract for public or private projects shall be issued or awarded to any contractor who did not have a current certificate of responsibility issued by said board [of contractors] at the time of submission of the bid…Any contract issued or awarded in violation of this section shall be null and void.

In United, the general contractor [United] entered into a contract with an owner [Wee Care] for the construction of a building. The contractor and its subcontractors were not paid for their work. The owner filed bankruptcy and the contractor filed suit against the lender [AmSouth] to recover its contract balance. AmSouth filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that because United did not have a valid certificate of responsibility, the contract was null and void. United argued that it did hold a certificate of responsibility, even though the certificate was issued in a classification different from the type of work being performed for Wee Care. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of AmSouth. United appealed the decision but the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling finding:

[T]he contract entered into between United and Wee Care was null and void because United failed to possess the appropriate certificate of responsibility for the type of work it undertook to perform. Having found that United’s contract with Wee Care was void, it follows that any contractual obligations AmSouth [the lender] may have owed [United or] the subcontractors are also void.

(emphasis added). If a contractor or subcontractor does not have a current certificate of responsibility, it may find itself in the position of having furnished labor and material on a project and not being paid. This could result in a financial disaster for one party and a windfall for the other party.

United makes it abundantly clear that owners, contractors and subcontractors should always check Mississippi State Board of Contractors to determine if the contractor or subcontractor holds a license for the work to be performed. It is also prudent for a party to confirm with the licensed entity that the qualifying party is currently an "owner, or a responsible managing employee, or a responsible managing officer, or a member of the executive staff…" See, Who Can be a "Qualifying Party" for a Contractor’s Certificate of Responsibility? Posted on this blog site by Christopher Solop, May 13, 2009.  (The State Board of Contractors has recently proposed an amendment to Rule L shortening the period to replace a qualifying party after the individual holding the certificate of responsibility leaves the employment of the company from 180 days to 90 days. This change will take effect on October 8, 2009.)